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Introduction 
 
Presented here is an innovation in lighting safety certification, and a description 
of its implementation for high explosives processing and storage facilities at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  Lightning rods have proven useful in 
the protection of wooden structures; however, modern structures made of rebar, 
concrete, and the like, require fresh thinking.   
 
Our process involves a rigorous and unique approach to lightning safety for 
modern buildings, were the internal voltages and currents are quantified and the 
risk assessed.  To follow are the main technical aspects of lightning protection for 
modern structures and these methods comply with the requirements of the 
National Fire Protection Association, the National Electrical Code, and the 
Department of Energy [1][2].  At the date of this release, we have certified over 
70 HE processing and storage cells at our Site 300 facility. 
 
The Faraday Cage Method 
 
Lightning and high explosives (HE) don’t mix.  Many explosives will detonate if 
too much electrical current passes through them.  A typical lightning strike has a 
peak current of 30 kA, and a very small fraction of this current is enough to fire a 
detonator.  Therefore, it is critical that explosive components be separated from 
the lightning current. 
 
Lightning rods with down-conductors are more appropriate for wooden structures, 
to prevent the lightning current from starting a fire.  In facilities with rebar and 
metal frames, it has been shown that most of the current will jump to the lower 
impedance of the metal structure of the building rather than remain on the down-
conductors.  Hence, the rod and down-conductor type of lightning protection 
system has serious limitations with respect to modern facilities. 
 
The preferred method of lightning protection for HE facilities at LLNL is a 
Faraday cage.  If struck by lightning, a perfect cage will distribute charge quickly 
and evenly, causing the electrical potential inside the cage to fall to zero, thus 
eliminating the risk of arcing through HE.  Surge suppression and step-down 
transformers are also employed in the certification process, but will not be 
detailed here. 
 
 Our facilities are, of course, not perfect Faraday cages due to the resistance and 
inductance of the materials, thus voltages develop within the cage.  Also, practical 
cages do not provide 100% optical coverage or symmetry, leading to non-zero 
potentials within.  With respect to practical buildings, good examples employ 
multiple layers of rebar that are tied together.  The maximum voltage inside a 
good cage occurs near the ceilings, walls, and wall openings, and will likely be 
less than 10 kV.  This residual voltage must be isolated from the explosives by an 
insulating barrier, in our case an air gap or standoff.  Thus, explosives are not 
permitted within a standoff distance of the walls, or other high potential areas.  
The standoff distance between the explosives and the walls is determined by the 
quality of the Faraday cage and poor cages result in high internal voltages and 
large standoff distances.  This could be due to inferior materials, or discontinuities 
within the cage, which could lead to internal arcing and concrete spalling, another 
danger to HE. 
 
By measuring the transfer impedance of the building/Faraday cage, we can 
determine its quality and calculate the interior voltage caused by a lightning 
strike. Metal penetrations such as pipes, conduits, and air vents to name a few, 
that pass through a wall, floor, or ceiling could increase the interior voltage of the 
cage at locations that are sometimes difficult to determine. These metal 
penetrations often originate from outside the facility, and if lightning were to 
strike them, they will carry current directly into the facility, possibly bypassing 
the cage. This sneak path must be eliminated by bonding the metal penetrations to 
the Faraday cage with a short cable or pig tail of a sufficient size.   
 
Lightning Threat Assessment 
 
In this report, we apply a novel technique based on low-power measurements, to 
assess the vulnerability of HE processing facilities against lightning. This 
technique is a subset of a more general methodology developed by LLNL to 
quantify RF vulnerability.  The lightning threat assessment technique consists of a 
site survey, lower-power RF measurement, and computer processing of the data to 
simulate the effect of a lightning strike.  The result is a predictive tool, where 
voltages and currents in bays and cells can be calculated for different lightning 
current profiles via a linear transfer function characterized by a transfer 
impedance. 
 
The accuracy of the predictions depends on, among other factors, the degree to 
which the relationship between the current and the resulting induced voltage 
remains linear at lightning energies.  A good Faraday cage minimizes electrical 
arc creation, which is a non-linear response.  Further, in a set of rocket-triggered 
lightning experiments, the non-linearities that did occur actually reduced the 
interior voltages [3].  Therefore, we assume a linear transfer function to be an 
adequate model of a good Faraday cage. 
  
 Measurement Description 
 
The entire measurement process is depicted in Fig. 1.  Preliminary setup includes 
driving ground rods at least 3 ft. in the earth, establishing a sound strike point, and 
then connecting the rods to this point via cables.  The transmission station is 
established by placing an inductive loop around the ground wires and driving the 
loop via a function generator.  A second inductive loop can be used to measure 
the induced current.  The receiving station is established by connecting a 
broadband antenna to a spectrum analyzer, and the transmission and receiving 
stations communicate via a fiber optic link, which minimizes the potential for 
erroneously coupled energy.  The measurement is performed over a frequency 
band consistent with naturally occurring lightning, 10 khz to 2.5 Mhz. 
 
 
Fig. 1  Experimental Setup. 
 
Transfer Impedance and Extrapolation to Standoff Distance 
 
Safety standoff distances are determined from computer processing of the 
measurement data, and are accomplished in three main steps. First, we calculate 
the building transfer impedance from the measurements. Second, we use the 
transfer impedance and realistic lightning current models to extrapolate the 
induced interior voltages of the building.  Finally, we calculate an appropriate 
standoff based on the resultant voltage levels, the breakdown thresholds in air, 
and additional safety factors.  The lighting current model we employ is extreme: a 
peak current of 200 kA and a rise rate of 400 kA/µs [4], which occurs in less than 
1% of all lightning strikes nationwide. 
 
 Computing the transfer impedance is essentially a system identification process 
that provides a linear model of the Faraday cage system.  Although other more 
complex system identification methods are available, we compute the transfer 
impedance by dividing the measured electric field by the low-power injected 
current and then multiplying by the floor-to-ceiling height of the building, which 
assumes a properly connected building [5].  This results in magnitude-only floor-
to-ceiling transfer impedances, since only the magnitude spectra of the electric 
field and low-power current are measured.  
 
If the complex magnitude and phase values of the transfer impedance were 
available, the extrapolated floor-to-ceiling voltage response could be obtained by 
convolution, or its frequency-domain equivalent.  However, the absence of phase 
information in the transfer impedance complicates matters, such that we utilize 
multiple methods and models, so that results may be evaluated for consistency 
and trusted. 
 
Regardless of which method is used, the peak of the absolute value of the 
extrapolated voltage waveform is used to compute the standoff distance at each 
location.  The dielectric breakdown strength of air is dependent upon pulse 
duration, among other things, and ranges from 5.5 kV/cm for a resistive-like 
voltage pulse to 9.0 kV/cm for an inductive-like voltage pulse [6]. We use the 
more conservative dielectric strength of 5.5 kV/cm.  An additional safety factor of 
2 is used, thus our formula for calculating the standoff distance, where Vpeak is in 
volts and D is in centimeters, is given by D = 2Vpeak/5500. 
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